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Because the lands could be identified, the court held that Hamilton
owned the submerged lands below the low water mark at the time the
lake was conveyed into public trust in 1913. The court of appeals then
remanded this issue to the district court to determine the level of the
low water mark in 1913.
Holly Shook

EIGHTH CIRCUIT
Mo. Soybean Ass'n v. EPA, 289 F.3d 509 (8th Cir. 2002) (dismissing
Missouri Soybean Association's claims of potential harm to its
members resulting from the Environmental Protection Agency's
stricter controls of the use of challenged waters in Missouri because
the claims were too remote and speculative).
Plaintiff, Missouri Soybean Association ("MSA") sued the United
States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") under the Clean
Water Act ("CWA") and the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA") in
the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri.
MSA claimed the EPA should have disapproved Missouri's list of
pollution-impaired waters because some of the waters included lacked
documentation of pollution. MSA's complaint focused on potential
harm to its members resulting from stricter controls of the use of the
challenged waters. The court consolidated MSA's suit with the Sierra
Club, Ozark Chapter's and the American Canoe Association, Inc.'s
("environmental plaintiffs") earlier lawsuit also challenging the EPA's
approval of Missouri's 1998 list claiming such list was under inclusive.
The EPA and the environmental plaintiffs settled their dispute
through a consent decree approved by the district court.
MSA moved for partial summary judgment on the merits of the
challenged water classification dispute. The EPA filed a motion to
dismiss, claiming MSA lacked standing and ripeness, and, in the
alternative, moving for summary judgment on the merits of the
challenged water classification dispute. The court assumed MSA had
standing, but found MSA's suit was not ripe for adjudication. Thus, it
denied MSA's motion for partial summary judgment and granted
partial summary judgment in favor of the EPA, dismissing MSA's suit
with prejudice. MSA's appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
States compile lists of impaired by, first, pursuant to the CWA,
identifying and prioritizing those waters within its boundaries that do
not meet the its water quality standards. Next, states submit the list of
impaired waters, known as the section 303(d) list, to the EPA for
approval. Finally, once the EPA approves the list, the impaired waters
undergo scientific study to establish the total maximum daily load
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("TMDL") of specifically identified pollutants that may be released
without violating state water quality standards.
In preparing its 1998 list, Missouri divided its waters into three
categories: (1) category one waters were impaired and scheduled for
full TMDL development; (2) category two waters were scheduled for
further monitoring because the water quality data was outdated and
less reliable; and (3) category three waters were declared as impaired
but with no practical remedy available because the pollution resulted
from minerals, nutrients, or sediment naturally occurring in the water.
Post classification, Missouri excluded the Missouri and the Mississippi
rivers ("big rivers") from its list, finding no water quality contaminant
violations. Subsequently, the EPA added several waters to Missouri's
list and declared the waters in all three categories impaired, requiring
Consequently, the Missouri Clean Water
TMDL development.
Commission added the big rivers to Missouri's section 303(d) list,
claiming the pollutant was "habitat loss" due to "channelization." The
EPA approved Missouri's revised list.
MSA claimed the EPA should have disapproved Missouri's section
303(d) list because the category two waters and the big rivers lacked
the required documentation of pollution to be listed as impaired.
MSA also asserted that the premature listing of the challenged waters
injured its members through: (1) potential changes in land
management practices; (2) limitations on crop growth and rotation;
(3) limitations on sale and use of fertilizers, pesticides and herbicides;
(4) decreases in property values; (5) increases in farming costs; and
(5) the inability to plan for and rely on the use of certain waters and
land caused by CWA's requirements.
On appeal, MSA first contended the district court erred when it
concluded that MSA's challenge was not ripe because it did not show
that EPA's approval of Missouri's 1998 list affected MSA's members in
any concrete way. The Eighth Circuit considered the suit's ripeness
for adjudication, stating the ripeness doctrine flows both from the
Article III cases and controversies limitation. The court further noted
that the ripeness doctrine also flows from prudential considerations
for refusing to exercise jurisdiction. Moreover, the ripeness doctrine
seeks "to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature
adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements
over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from
judicial interference until an administrative decision has been
formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging
parties." Thus, for a case to be ripe for decision, it must be fit for
judicial resolution, and the parties must experience hardship in the
event the court withholds consideration of the case's merits.
The court concluded that MSA's claims were speculative and not
ripe for judicial resolution, for although MSA's complaint focused on
potential harm to its members resulting from stricter controls of the
use of the challenged waters, the more stringent controls on water use
would not occur until after TMDLs were developed and implemented.
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Even then, the court noted, it would remain uncertain whether TMDL
development or regulatory implementation would adversely impact
the members. Thus, it was clear the EPA's approval of Missouri's 1998
list failed to affect MSA's members in any concrete way.
The court next considered MSA's contention that because the EPA
challenged jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss and not a motion for
summary judgment, the court should hold MSA to a relatively modest
standard of asserting jurisdiction in its pleadings. MSA argued that
under the liberal pleading standard; its assertion of potential decreases
in property values stated a current harm sufficient to present a ripe
claim. Although the court agreed that it should hold MSA to a modest
standard of asserting jurisdiction in its pleadings, it found that MSA's
complaint did not support this contention. The court noted the
complaint described a "potential... decrease in property values
and/or property rights as a result of Clean Water Act requirements."
Considering this language in context, the court found that the "as a
result of Clean Water Act requirements" clause was consistent with
MSA's other claims of harm that could occur after the implementation
of TMDLs. Further, the court found that MSA's argument that even if
harm had not yet occurred, but was certainly impending also failed,
stating the "potential" diminution of property values was not a
sufficiently immediate or sizeable threatened harm to warrant judicial
intervention.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision finding
that MSA's claims of harm were too remote to be anything other than
speculative and not ripe for judicial resolution, however it dismissed
the suit without prejudice for lack ofjurisdiction.
Gloria MariaSoto
NINTH CIRCUIT
San Francisco BayKeeper v. Whitman, 287 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2002)
(affirming that the United States Environmental Protection Agency
did not have a non-discretionary duty to establish water pollution
standards for the State of California since the constructive submission
doctrine, which triggers the Environmental Protection Agency's nondiscretionary duty to act, did not apply when California submitted
some total maximum daily loads).
Environmental group San Francisco BayKeeper ("BayKeeper")
appealed a summary judgment decision by the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California dismissing BayKeeper's
claim that the State of California ("California") failed to both
implement an adequate water pollution control program and establish
total maximum daily loads ("TMDLs"). BayKeeper argued California

